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n Interest in the codification of the criminal law is currently at a high point because
of the American Law Institute's proposal to prepare a model criminal code and be-
cause of the Wisconsin project previously described in these pages. In the following
article Professor Hall, an eminent authority in the field, comments on the significance of
codification and on some of the problems involved.
Codification of the Criminal Law
By Jerome Hall
Professor of Law, Indiana University
m Codification of the criminal law
involves problems, methods and val-
ues which are important not only
for the current practice of law in
many of its branches; they also raise
challenging questions about the fu-
ture practice of law and the func-
tions of the Bar.
The illustrious precedent estab-
lished by Edward Livingston should
help persuade leaders of the Bar that
they have an obligation to contribute
their skills to penal codification.
Moreover, the recent enormous ex-
pansion of the criminal law in corpo-
rate and commercial areas involves
the interest of many clients, which
can not be safeguarded by occasional
dips into criminal law. A sustained
thoughtful effort to codify the crimi-
nal law is an excellent way to become
familiar with that important branch
of the corpus juris.
The time is opportune for a revival
of the traditional interest of the
American Bar in the criminal law be-
cause of the current codification
movement. In 1947 Louisiana
adopted a criminal code; and there
are similar projects under way in
Wisconsin and other states. And the
American Law Institute has recently
initiated a national program to pro-
vide a model criminal code.'
The criminal law is largely ex-
pressed in statutes which in most
states at the present time comprise
a veritable hodgepodge. There is a
pressing need to organize these mate-
rials so that obsolete rules can be
eliminated, inconsistencies resolved,
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and the retained laws readily located.
These obviously needed immediate
objectives can in good measure be
attained by a careful examination
and ordering of the existing statutes.
Codification, looking far beyond
that important objective, seeks to
systematize the entire criminal law.
For example, modern penal codes
are divided into a General Part and
a Special Part, the former including
principles and doctrines applicable
to all crimes, while the latter includes
only the distinctive material elements
of the various specific crimes. Thus,
in a sound criminal code, the various
parts are logically interrelated, and
the consequences for adjudication
and practice are analogous to the
achievements of a science as con-
trasted with a mere aggregate of un-
related bits of knowledge on various
subjects.
The codification of the criminal
law includes objectives that extend
far beyond even the systematization
of all existing statutes and decisions.
What is called for, in sum, is the
most searching study of the entire
criminal law that is possible, the dis-
covery of necessary reforms, and a
clear precise code which reflects the
best relevant knowledge of the prob-
lems of criminal law. The potential-
ities of such an inquiry for legal
progress are so great that any present
estimate must be a severe under-
statement.
During the past half century there
has been an enormous growth in
scientific and social knowledge which
is relevant to the problems of crimi-
nal law. These disciplines also com-
prise a variegated, often tricky, ter-
rain where some are tempted to ac-
cept all of the claims put forth in
the name of science, while others,
sensing a threat to important values,
reject the new learning in toto. What
is needed, however, is thoughtful
criticism and judicious use of what-
ever knowledge withstands such anal-
ysis.
For example, this century has wit-
nessed the rise of psychiatry to a
position of great importance for the
criminal law. When one explores the
literature of psychiatry he discovers
that some previously neglected facts
are well established, e.g., the large
role of unconscious drives and emo-
tions. But he also finds much dog-
matism, conflicting theories and
naive criticism of the bases of legal
liability. The obvious desideratum
is to cull the sound from the falla-
cious and to utilize the former in
improvement of the law. This is not
as simply done as said; and the pres-
ent major obstacle is the lack of par-
ticipation in relevant inquiries by
competent members of the Bar.
The hazard we face is that the the-
ories and opinions of nonlegal spe-
cialists will prevail, unchallenged by
the scrutiny of competent lawyers
who have studied the relevant sci-
ences and disciplines. Unfortunately
the "average practitioner" is apt to
react in one of two ways: either he
will say, "How can I pit my judgment
about psychiatry against that of a
recognized authority?" Or he will
say, "All of that 'stuff' is dogmatic,
fallacious, and dangerous. Away with
it!" But if there is a large core of
valid knowledge in psychiatry, which
has very important bearings on vital
legal and social issues, neither of
these reactions is defensible. Since the
problems to be dealt with are ulti-
mately legal ones, some competent
lawyers-and the more the better-
must appraise the relevant claims of
scientific and other knowledge, and
1. An excellent statement of the American
Law Institute's project has been supplied by the
Reporter, Professor Herbert Wechsler, in "The
Challenge of a Model Penal Code", 65 Horv. L.
Rev. 1097 (1952).
Department of Legislation
contribute the kind of analysis that
must be available if our law is to
progress.
To cite another specific instance of
present needs and opportunities, it
is only in the past quarter of a cen-
tury that scientific knowledge of al-
coholism has been supplied. This also
has important implications for crimi-
nal law because although intoxica-
tion is a factor in many crimes, few
courts have been informed of the
available facts and knowledge. Solu-
tion of all the relevant legal prob-
lems again depends upon lawyers'
familiarity with the literature on al-
coholism to the point of being able
to participate intelligently in con-
ferences with experts in that field.
With reference to juvenile delin-
quency, sex crimes, theft and many
other types of harmful behavior, con-
siderable knowledge has also become
available, which a broadly conceived
program of codification should util-
ize.
As was indicated above, such a
project, while it provides unparal-
leled opportunities to reappraise and
improve a very important branch of
the law, is also hazardous. Consider,
for example, the claims of superior
knowledge put forth by social scien-
tists and psychiatrists who criticize
the criminal law as archaic and com-
pletely untouched by recent science.
Again, some psychiatrists hold that
crime is a disease, that all criminals
are sick. Obviously such a theory has
drastic implications for moral and
legal standards of criminal liability.
The validity of the thesis pro-
pounded by the experts must be
carefully evaluated by lawyers since
there is no short cut to uniformly
held "better answers". The above
theory of crime may represent the
position of relatively few, but tre-
mendously articulate, psychiatrists.
Subjected to the hard tests of experi-
ence, common sense and opposing
scientific positions, it may be totally
unsound. On the other hand, it may
have important relevance for some
offenders. In any case, ill-phrased as
the theory often is, it challenges the
legal profession to establish a sound
relationship between law and science.
A second major hazard in codifica-
tion concerns the principle of legal-
ity, the "rule of law" in the field of
crimes. Statutes and case-law now
provide specific definitions, proscrip-
tions and, consequently, limitations
on official power. The threat to this
dearly won tradition comes from two
directions. Draftsmen, intent on logi-
cal and aesthetic results, may also be
unmindful of the relevant political
values, and they may draft many pro-
visions in general terms. They may
even wish to confer upon the courts
great powers of discretion in inter-
preting the criminal code. Such inno-
vations would undermine the prin-
ciple of legality in the field of crimes.
The remedy is insistence on retention
of the common law of crimes, espe-
cially in interpretation of general,
vague or ambiguous phrases, realistic
precision in drafting the code, and
uncompromising adherence to the
values that protect individuals from
the iron hand of the state when it is
applying the heavy sanctions of penal
law. This danger to basic legal safe-
guards is abetted by social scientists
who imagine that their discipline has
achieved the status of an exact sci-
ence. In effect, they demand that
their opinions be substituted for legal
controls. The short answer to such
demands is that the nonlegal experts
should be kept on tap, but not on
top. A fuller, better answer is a
careful critique of the relevant disci-
plines and values of a democratic
legal order.
The deliberate recognition of pos-
sible dangers involved in codification
of the criminal law is a necessary
condition of legal progress. However,
it provides no defense of the unin-
formed or of ostrich-like indifference.
Nor can potential dangers to existing
institutions be avoided by indiscrim-
inate opposition to all proposed re-
forms. Change is inevitable, and the
preservation of sound values, as well
as the implementation of important
new ones, requires considerable ef-
fort. There is no escape, therefore,
at least for thoughtful persons, from
active, sincere, searching inquiry.
Consequently, the over-all ques-
tion concerning codification of the
criminal law is this-how can one
best participate in such an enterprise
or, more directly, what methods
should be used to provide the best
possible code? The available methods
include both traditional, professional
methods and scientific methods. In
the past, codification has been the
product of traditional, professional
methods, i.e., of preponderant con-
cern with statutes, codes, case-law
and treatises. Since law does not
exist in a vacuum, critical appraisal
of the legal materials was, of course,
enlightened by common sense, expe-
rience and such smatterings of scien-
tific knowledge as became fortuitous-
ly available. Scientific methods of
codification do not exclude or de-
preciate the use of the legal materials
or the professional techniques of
applying them. They supplement
them by (1) concentration on rele-
vant facts; (2) thorough use of scien-
tific and other relevant knowledge;
(3) articulation of methods employed
and steps taken so that (a) the best
methods are used and (b) the various
steps in the investigation can be re-
traced and checked; (4) the entire
procedure is carried on systemati-
cally, and (5) a final record of rele-
vant empirical science and ethical
knowledge is provided.
It is possible to argue that alleg-
edly scientific methods add nothing
but pretension to the traditional
professional ones. It is possible to
argue that the difference is not novel
but only represents an emphasis. It
is possible to argue that the difference
is monumental and that the implica-
tions for the functions of the legal
profession in the future are revolu-
tionary in the best sense. These issues
cannot be discussed here.2 What is
possible in this brief comment is to
urge unbiased reflection on the im-
portance of factual investigation in
relation to legal problems and appre-
ciation of the persistent use of avail-
able knowledge and the best methods
of research.
Without elaboration of the divi-
sions of the indicated factual-legal
2. See generally, Jerome Hall, Theft, Law and
Society (2d ed. 1952).
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researches which, in the writer's judg-
ment, are necessary to the production
of the best possible code, the follow-
ing outline may be suggestive:
1. Intensive factual research into
certain social problems regarding
which legal controls are or should be
employed, together with a critique
of the relevant values.
2. A thorough study of the rele-
vant existing law. This includes not
only its restatement, together with
commentaries, but also its history
and, especially, researches into its
functioning.3
3. Many legal problems would be
formulated in the light of the two
preceding stages of the work. Espe-
cially important would be the dis-
covery and formulation of problems
which can in good measure be solved
if available factual knowledge is
soundly employed.
4. The relevant disciplines and
sciences would be searched (and con-
ferences of specialists and lawyers
arranged) to provide the necessary
information and knowledge, in the
light of which the provisions of the
code would be drafted.
5. A record should be provided
which, in effect, would be the empir-
ical scientific foundation and the
rationale of the values upon which
the code was constructed. The least
advantage of such a record would be
to facilitate pointed informed dis-
cussion as well as improvement of the
code in future years, as scientific and
moral knowledge progressed.
That scientific and other sound
methods of research can be used very
profitably in analysis and solution of
legal problems is no longer a pious
hope or exhortation. Several extant
large-scale studies and numerous
shorter ones supply specific concrete
illustrations and supports of the
above assertion. Their implications
for other fields of law than the crimi-
nal law and, consequently, for the
functions of the Bar are very signifi-
cant.
3. As to the significance of the functioning of
rules for both the understanding of present law
and the discovery of needed reforms, see Hall,
Theft, Low and Society (2d ed. 1952).
Notice by the Board of Elections
z The following jurisdictions will
elect a State Delegate for a three-year
term beginning at the adjournment
of the 1953 Annual Meeting and
ending at the adjournment of the
1956 Annual Meeting:
Alabama
Alaska
California
Florida
Hawaii
Kansas
Kentucky
Massachusetts
Missouri
New Mexico
North Carolina
North Dakota
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Vermont
Virginia
Wisconsin
Nominating petitions for all State
Delegates to be elected in 1953
must be filed with the Board of
Elections not later than March 27,
1953. Petitions received too late for
publication in the March issue of
the JOURNAL (deadline for March
issue, January 28; deadline for April
issue, February 27; deadline for May
issue, March 31) cannot be pub-
lished prior to distribution of bal-
lots, fixed by the Board of Elections
for April 3, 1953. Ballots must be
returned by June 8, 1953.
Forms of nominating petitions
may be obtained from the Headquar-
ters of the American Bar Associa-
tion, 1140 North Dearborn Street,
Chicago 10, Illinois. Nominating pe-
titions must be received at the Head-
quarters of the Association before
the close of business at 5:00 P.M.,
March 27, 1953.
Attention is called to Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides:
Not less than one hundred and
fifty days before the opening of the
annual meeting in each year, twenty-
five or more members of the Asso-
ciation in good standing and ac-
credited to a State from which a State
Delegate is to be elected in that year,
may file with the Board of Elections,
constituted as hereinafter provided, a
signed petition (which may be in
parts), nominating a candidate for
the office of State Delegate for and
from such state.
Only signatures of members in
good standing will be counted. A
member who is in default in the pay-
ment of dues for six months is not
a member in good standing. Each
nominating petition must be ac-
companied by a typewritten list of
the names and addresses of the sign-
ers in the order in which they ap-
pear on the petition.
Special notice is hereby given that
no more than twenty-five names of
signers to any petition will be pub-
lished.
Ballots will be mailed to the mem-
bers in good standing accredited to
the states in which elections are to
be held within thirty days after the
time for filing nominating petitions
expires.
BOARD OF ELECTIONS
Edward T. Fairchild, Chairman
William P. MacCracken, Jr.
Harold L. Reeve.
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